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In the last 30 years, China has achieved high economic growth and successfully 
transformed its economy from a planned economy to a market-based system. The 
country, to a large extent, has attained success through the recommendations proposed 
by standard economic theory. However, the role of political economy has been omitted 
from the literature: how did China adopt the right economic policies and the appropriate 
road to reform? This paper attempts to answer this question. The central assumption of 
the paper is that China achieved success because the Chinese government has been a 
disinterested party, i.e., a government that does not favour any particular sections of the 
population and prioritizes the long-term welfare of the whole society. In this paper, we 
first define and analyse the concept of disinterested governments, and then proceed to 
provide several examples to demonstrate that China has been characterized by a 
disinterested government. Based on a theoretical model, we also discuss the reasons of 
the Chinese government becoming a disinterested government. 
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1 Introduction 
Any unbiased observer would consider China’s progress over the last 30 years a 
success. The country has maintained an average annual growth rate of 9.7 per cent and 
transformed its economy from a planned system to a market-based one. The Chinese 
society, defying repeated warnings of an imminent collapse, has remained relatively 
stable yet dynamic, and for the majority of the people, the last three decades constitute 
the best period of the last 130 years, or since the Imperial China lost its confrontation 
with the western powers in the Opium War. For example, the per capita GDP has 
increased from US$250 at the end of the 1970s to US$3,330 dollars (current prices) in 
2008 and the number of people in absolute poverty has decreased from the early 1980s 
figure of 300 million to 80 million today (NBS 2009).  
China’s economic success, to a large extent, can be attributed to its almost relentless 
reform drive towards a free market economy. Although its reform path was rather 
unconventional, the ultimate policies and institutions in China have been clearly 
converging towards what standard economics advocates. If there are success stories to 
the Washington consensus, then China must be counted as one of them, and viewed 
from this perspective, there is nothing miraculous in its record growth (Perkins 2005). 
But this leaves an important question unanswered: if the economic theories were so 
right, why have not most of the developing countries followed them? Or, in other 
words, how has the People’s Republic of China (PRC) been able to adopt the right 
recipes for growth? The explanation can be found only by examining the political 
economy of China’s miraculous economic growth in the last thirty years. 
Central to this paper is the argument that China’s success lies in its disinterested 
government. A disinterested government is one that does not differentiate between the 
interests of different segments of society. Such a government is more likely to be what 
Olson (1982) calls an encompassing organization whose interests overlap with those of 
the whole society. That is, it is more likely to foster the country’s overall economic 
growth instead of advancing the interests of the population segments it represents or has 
formed an alliance with.  
We identify three major reasons why the Chinese government became a disinterested 
government in the reform era. The first reason is the lesson learned during period of 
1949-78, when the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) modelled itself as a working-class 
party and emphasized class struggles in conjunction with economic construction. The 
results were dismal and led to a crisis regarding its legitimacy. Second, the Chinese 
society was unusually equal at the beginning of the reform period, thanks to the 1949 
Communist Revolution and the egalitarian policies of the ensuing years, 1949-78. If 
society is equal, the government has no incentive to form alliances with any population 
sectors because these alliances will not be strong enough to offset attempts by the 
discontented to revolt. Third, the CCP made conscious adjustments to its own ideology 
and social affiliation, successfully transforming itself from a working-class party to an 
all people’s party. 
In the rest of the paper, we first examine (section 2) how China responded to the 
standard recommendations of the Washington consensus, as it was originally formulated 
by Williamson, and show that China has been following this advice for the last three 
decades. In section 3, we argue that the authoritarian nature of its government was not a 
key factor for China adopting the appropriate economic policies. In section 4, we 2 
present our theory of disinterested governments, linking the concept to Mancur Olson’s 
notion of encompassing organizations and then discussing their differences. We present 
evidence in section 5 to show that the Chinese government was indeed disinterested 
during the reform era, and in section 6, we analyse the three reasons that led to this 
outcome. We conclude by discussing the applicability of the Chinese experience to 
other developing countries in section 7. 
2  A case for the Washington consensus 
Many authors, both within and outside China, believe that the country achieved 
economic success by deliberately defying certain recommendations of good economic 
policies advanced by standard economic theories, such as those of the Washington 
consensus. The Beijing consensus proposed by Joshua Ramo (2004) is but one example. 
However, these authors may have confused China’s path of transition with its aim of 
transition. Undoubtedly, China adopted a unique path of reform, and in many cases the 
results did not comply with standard economic institutions. It is also admittedly true that 
China has not unconditionally followed the advice of international donors or other 
governments; it opened to the world, but on its own terms and at its own pace. The aim 
of China’s transition, however, was clear: to establish a market economy.  
In the original formulation (Williamson 1990), the Washington consensus emphasized 
the following key policy recommendations: 
–  Fiscal discipline; 
–  Reordering public expenditure priorities away from non-merit subsidies and 
toward public goods (e.g., health and education); 
–  Tax reform that combines broad tax base with moderate marginal rates; 
–  Liberalized interest rate; 
–  Trade liberalization; 
–  Liberalization of inward foreign direct investment; 
–  Privatization; 
–  Deregulation to ease barriers of firms for entry and exit of sectors; and 
–  Strong protection of property rights. 
On balance, over the last three decades China has closely followed most of these 
recommendations, with the exception of interest rate liberalization. As a discussion of 
the reasons for this exception is beyond the scope of this paper, the rest of this section 
will focus on the achievements of China. 
In terms of fiscal discipline, the government has been cautious to maintain a roughly 
balanced budget; debt has never surpassed tax revenue. Prudent fiscal policies have led 
to a stable economy, and over the last three decades, China has experienced three 
inflation waves (mid-1980s, mid-1990s, and mid-2000s), none of which were serious. 
The highest inflation rate, 24 per cent per annum, was in 1994.  3 
On the expenditure side, the fiscal authorities have also been very prudent, conservative 
even. Pure interregional fiscal transfers have been kept to the minimum because of 
insufficient amount of formula-based transfers, and majority of the central 
government’s transfers to local levels has been project-based. Although this tends to 
increase regional imbalance, project-based transfers have been production-enhancing as 
they are used mostly for building infrastructure (Yao 2008). Before 2003, social 
spending was maintained at a minimum. Although social spending has picked up slowly 
in recent years, its share in government budget is still low. Indeed, the government is 
frequently criticized for spending too little on social protection. 
In terms of taxation, the overall tax burden in China declined dramatically between 
1978 and 1993 due to fiscal decentralization. Prior to 1993, government revenue was 
only about 17 per cent of China’s GDP (Yao 2008). The 1993 fiscal reform greatly 
strengthened taxation capacities of the governments, bringing the amount of 
government revenues close to one-fourth of GDP. But the fast growth in government 
revenues has raised concerns from both society and the government itself. The rate of 
corporate income tax was lowered from 33 per cent to 25 per cent; the deduction of 
personal income tax was raised several times; and the value-added tax is likely to 
provide relief for capital investment. It is noteworthy that the competition among the 
regions for funds has played a role in curbing the growth of government revenues. 
On the international front, China has taken a road that has decisively led to 
liberalization of trade and foreign direct investment (FDI), even though the country has 
successfully followed its own pace of opening up. Openness, especially in the form of 
the special economic zones, was the centrepiece of China’s reform policy for most of 
the last thirty years. Export-led growth was adopted as a national development strategy 
in the mid-1980s. Joining the WTO in 2001 marked China’s full integration into the 
world economy. Since then, China’s trade dependence ratio, i.e., the ratio of imports 
and exports in GDP, has been in excess of 60 per cent, the highest among the large 
economies. Besides trade, China began to open to FDI in the early stage of 
development: the fact that 60 per cent of China’s exports are contributed by FDI firms is 
indicative of the depth of FDI involvement in the country.  
China’s domestic reform targets were privatization and deregulation, which aimed to 
remove the two pillars of economic planning: state ownership and price control, 
respectively. After fifteen years of privatization starting from the mid-1990s, most of 
the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are either in private hands, or have transformed into 
public companies listed on the stock market. Only a handful of powerful SOEs are still 
owned and controlled by the government. Price control was dismantled even prior to 
privatization, and the government reform at the end of the 1990s further removed many 
of the barriers of firms to entry and exit. 
Although protection of property rights is still weak in many arenas (especially 
intellectual property rights), PRC has made noticeable progress. The flourish of private 
firms indicates that private ownership has been respected, at least to a certain extent. 
Several amendments to the constitution and enactment of the property law have 
established a reasonable (albeit incomplete) legal framework for property rights 
protection. The situation is far from perfect, but is decisively headed towards better, 
stronger protection. 4 
In addition to China’s conformance with the Washington consensus in its transition 
goals, the country adopted other policies frequently prescribed by the development 
economics literature as essential to economic growth. Among these, high saving and 
investment rates and an emphasis on primary education are two of the most significant. 
Although the income gap between rural and urban areas has widened, the dominance of 
labour-intensive exports has enabled China to shift 140 million rural residents from 
agriculture into higher-income industrial sectors. Sustained economic growth has lifted 
more than 200 million people out of absolute poverty in the past three decades. Thus, 
the Chinese growth has been largely inclusive, which lends support to the emerging 
agreement in the literature of the causal relationship going from equality to growth.  
Countries that have adopted the right economic policies, however, have been a minority 
among the developing countries. Only 13 economies have been able to maintain an 
uninterrupted growth rate of 7 per year or more for 25 years or longer after the Second 
World War, and most of these are in east and southeast Asia. The lack of knowledge 
cannot explain why most countries have failed to adopt the appropriate economic 
policies because, for one, only basic economic training is needed to understand these 
policies. In addition, such policies have been frequently advocated or even imposed on 
the developing countries by international donors as a precondition for aid. A serious 
study should therefore be undertaken to look at the reasons why governments in most 
developing countries have failed to adopt the right economic policies.  
3  Authoritarianism, or something else? 
In searching for a political economy explanation for China’s economic success, the easy 
answer could be that the country benefited from the authoritarian state. The proponents 
of this concept would argue that an authoritarian state has the power to mobilize people 
and resources in striving for high economic growth. This seems to be the accepted 
wisdom within the international arena and is often echoed within China as well. In a 
recent article, the former American Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice (2008) writes: 
 Democratization is also deepening across the Asia-Pacific region. This 
is expanding our circle of allies and advancing the goals we share. 
Indeed, although many assume that the rise of China will determine the 
future of Asia, so, too—and perhaps to an even greater degree—will the 
broader rise of an increasingly democratic community of Asian states.  
Clearly, Ms Rice implicitly excludes China from the democratic camp and links China’s 
future dominance to the authoritarian nature of its state. 
However, the authoritarian state was neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition in 
order for China to achieve its high economic growth. As the experience of China shows, 
the existence of an authoritarian state is not sufficient because it may embrace wrong 
goals or represent the interests of small groups of people. Its growth record during the 
planning period was unimpressive even though the country was decisively more 
authoritarian at that time than during the subsequent reform period. The right-wing 
military regimes in Latin America that protected the interests of the elites and 
suppressed the demands of the majority, exemplify the second condition. This narrow 
mandate made sustained economic growth impossible and led to the collapse of these 5 
regimes. An authoritarian state is not a necessary condition for high economic growth, 
as some democracies have also achieved record growth. For example, Botswana is 
functional democracy and is among the thirteen countries enjoying sustained economic 
development in the post-war period. India, also a functioning democracy, has recorded 
substantial growth since it began reform in 1991. A democracy can be slow in reaching 
a consensus, but is not intrinsically incongruent with economic growth.  
Indeed, the dichotomy between authoritarianism and democracy itself is misleading. 
Even the most democratic countries, if they are built on the concept of representation, 
the ideal virtually all democracies adhere to, contain authoritarian elements. The most 
telling example was President Bush’s insistence on continuing the Iraqi war despite its 
unpopularity in the United States. Conversely, even the most authoritarian states leave 
space for democratic decisions. For example, farmers in the communes discussed 
economic decisions and voted on these even in the heydays of China’s planning era, 
which was characterized by political and economic controls. Most countries fall 
between absolute democracy and absolute despotism. The Chinese state, although 
dominated by an authoritarian polity, does not lack space for economic liberty, popular 
political participation, and even genuine democracy.  
The Chinese Constitution permits a considerable degree of popular participation. Each 
village is defined as a self-governing entity: the farmers themselves elect their leaders 
and decide on village affairs. Above the village is the local legislative body to which 
delegates are directly elected. The same applies to the people’s congress at the district 
level in the cities. Above the county and district administrative levels, delegates are 
elected indirectly to the municipal, provincial, and national people’s congress by the 
representatives of county and district people’s congress. At all administrative levels, the 
people’s congress has rights similar to those in any other country embodied by their 
parliament. The problem is that these rights in reality may not be fully exercised, but 
positive progress is happening at the grassroots. 
The most significant progress is the village election. China started to experiment with 
village elections as early as the 1980s. In 1988, the National People’s Congress (NPC) 
passed an experimental version of the Organizational Law of the Village Committee 
stipulating that the village committee—the self-governing body of the Chinese 
community—must be elected. This law triggered wide-spread elections across the 
country. In 1998, the NPC formalized the law, with the condition that the candidates for 
the village committee had to be nominated by the villagers. Currently, democratic 
elections are common in almost every village, and the outcomes are quite encouraging, 
enhancing the accountability of the committee. In particular, the process has increased 
public spending while simultaneously reducing the share of administrative spending in 
the village budget, improving income distribution, and leading to more public 
investment (Zhang et al. 2004; Wang and Yao 2007; Shen and Yao forthcoming).   
Delegates to the township, county and urban district people’s congresses, the 
administrative levels above the village, are directly elected, as required by the 
constitution. Although nomination is not free from interference by the government, 
there are signs that elections have become more competitive in some localities. 
Concurrent with this trend, county and district people’s congresses are becoming more 
effective in monitoring government functioning, especially budget allocations. At the 
national level, both the NPC and NPCC (National People’s Consultative Conference) 
are involving more members with professional backgrounds. Although the political 6 
structure has remained more or less intact, inclusion of these new members will enhance 
the ability of the two legislative bodies to monitor the government. Although the system 
is still far removed from a true democracy, democracy as a long-term goal has taken 
roots in China, and even top government leaders do not deny the fact (Thornton 2008). 
There is also considerable room for free speech within China’s one-party system. 
Although there are still areas—noticeably foreign policy, religion and the one-party rule 
itself—where open public discourse is restricted, the press is quite candid in other areas 
including government policies in social and economic arenas, corruption, and 
democratization. In addition to traditional media, the internet has provided 
unprecedented freedom for personal expression including dissident views on China’s 
political system. These views have gained weight in the country’s political process, and 
government leaders at various levels take these into account in their decisionmaking. 
Intellectuals have actively participated in public debates, and although a certain degree 
of censorship still exists, their views are often heard and tolerated even when very 
radical. 
A new development is that the civil society has become much stronger in today’s China. 
Non-governmental organizations have been accepted, at least to complement 
governmental actions. More subtle, but more important development happens at the 
grassroots level. Old communities are reviving as life becomes more stable and income 
increases considerably, and new communities are emerging on the basis of common 
interests in addition to geographic proximity. This includes private clubs related to 
common interests (driving, tourism and so on), intellectual circles as well as residential 
communities. The internet plays an important role in these grassroots organizations. 
Although politics is often deliberately excluded from the agendas, these newly emerged 
communities can quickly form organized resistance, should their interests be infringed 
upon by the government. 
In light of the above evidence, one has to realize that the Chinese state is more complex 
than can be described by the term authoritarianism, and its success in adopting the right 
economic policies needs to be explained by a mechanism more extensive than the 
obvious authoritarian elements. In order to offer general implications, this mechanism 
needs to encompass authoritarianism and democracy because successful stories are 
evident in countries that can conventionally be defined as authoritarian and democratic. 
One such mechanism is the disinterested government identified in this paper. In the next 
section, we provide a general discussion of this concept and its implications for 
economic growth. 
4 Disinterested  governments 
By a disinterested government, we mean a government that is impartial towards 
different sections of the society. To be more precise, it is a government that does not 
form an alliance with, or provide favourable treatment to, any specific social section. It 
is not necessarily a neutral government lacking its own interests. It can, instead, have its 
own agenda and self interests. The key argument here is that a disinterested government 
is more likely than a partial government to adopt growth-enhancing economic policies 
even beyond its own strategic choices.  7 
A partial government, by definition, prioritizes or favours the interests and welfare of 
certain groups of people over other population groups. This hurts long-term growth. 
When the represented groups do not have political dominance in the country, it leads to 
competition among interest groups which in turn, as Mancur Olson forcefully argues in 
his seminal 1982 book, demands are greater for redistributing the resources than for 
enlarging the pie. When the represented groups have the political and social power to 
suppress others, it gives government the freedom to advance only the interests of the 
represented people, ignoring others. Often, in developing countries, the dominant 
political groups are comprised of a small number of elites, and this explains to a large 
extent the extreme income inequality in these countries. Curiously enough, it is in these 
countries that populist governments are more likely to emerge. This is largely the result 
of the backlash of the poor for regaining power from the elites. A populist government, 
even though it represents the majority of the society, is not a disinterested government, 
precisely because it aligns its interests with those of a specific group of people. Both 
theory and empirical evidence show that long-term growth is not possible under a 
populist government because a populist government, by definition, is obliged to engage 
in redistribution to please the populace. If it serves to enhance people’s ability to 
generate income, redistribution does not hamper growth. However, most governments 
of this type go beyond that characterization, promising expensive welfare programmes 
to win the support of ordinary citizens, and these have to be compensated by slower 
capital accumulation and ultimately slower economic growth. Argentina under Peron’s 
rule is but one example.  
A disinterested government can still be predatory, but less so than a partial government. 
First, a disinterested government is more likely than a partial government to treat each 
population group equally. This is because differential treatment of the various groups 
induces no specific gain, but increases the chances of challenge by the mistreated 
sectors. It might be worthwhile for a government to harbour predatory behaviour 
towards weak rather than strong groups. But the stock of wealth held by weak groups 
can be small, and once predation exceeds a certain level, the masses may revolt. Fair 
treatment of each group is, in most cases, the optimal choice for a disinterested 
government. Thus, disinterested government tends to be more concerned with—or, to be 
more precise—to pursue interests that coincide with those of the entire society. 
Consequently, it is more likely to care about the long-term welfare of the populace than 
a partial government because equal treatment reduces redistribution demands (Alesina 
and Rodrik 1994). As we argued before, populist pressures are more severe in countries 
with divisive social groups where ordinary citizens perceive themselves as being 
exploited by the elites.   
As the pursuit of economic growth is likely to coincide with the long-term welfare of 
the whole society, improvement is more likely to happen under a disinterested 
government than a partial government. Unfortunately, there are more partial 
governments than disinterested governments in the developing world. Two archetypes 
of governments typify that part of the world: the elite and the populist governments. Of 
course, purely elite-dominated governments and purely populist governments are 
exceptional in today’s world, but the combination or alternation of the two is often 
observed. Many south and southeast Asian countries are characterized by the mixture of 
elite and populist politics, while those in Latin America are an alternation of the two. 
These countries started with elite dominance, but democratization opened the door for 
popular participation. Greater popular participation would have been a virtue, had these 
countries had social equality. The elites, however, have continued to dominate socially, 8 
politically, and economically, which means that ordinary people are not getting their 
proportional distribution share of the increasing pie. As a result, they prefer to demand 
for greater redistribution instead of making investments for the future.  
There were also certain impediments to the emergence of a disinterested government in 
China. In addition to the objective of fast economic growth, China needed to complete 
the transition from a planned economy to a market-based one. Except for a few reforms 
(the rural reform) that were Pareto improving, most measures have involved substantial 
reconfiguration of the gains and losses among different population groups. Reforms 
would have not moved towards the market if the government had hesitated over the 
interests of specific groups. Furthermore, China is a vast country with one of the most 
decentralized fiscal systems in the world, which created strong local concerns not 
always aligned with those of the entire nation. While fiscal decentralization may 
enhance local incentives for local economic growth (Qian and Weingast 1997), it leads 
to regional protectionism, inferior provision of public goods within the relatively large 
scope of geographic coverage, and perhaps most significantly, the commercialization of 
local governments. Oi (1992) describes the behaviour of local governments in China as 
‘local state corporatism’. But in reality, local governments are more than authoritarian 
identities able to contain the local forces; they have become companies advancing their 
own interests only, and it often falls on the central government to bring local interests in 
line with the national agenda. However, the central government itself is segmented by 
ministries that have their own patronages and interests. Most industrial policies are 
proposed and formulated by the ministries and it is not uncommon to find that they are 
embodied in special industrial groups. Ministries also keep extra-budgetary revenues 
that bypass government auditing. In summary, it is not nature for a disinterested 
government to emerge either in China or other developing countries.  
It is noteworthy that our notion of disinterested governments shares some 
commonalities with Olson’s concept of encompassing organizations. Olson (1982: 47) 
defines these as organizations that ‘encompass a substantial portion of the societies of 
which they are a part’. That is, they represent a significant share of the population in a 
country. What makes a difference is that ‘the incentives facing an encompassing 
special-interest organization are dramatically different from those facing an 
organization that presents only a narrow segment of society’ (Olson 1982: 48). This can 
be illustrated by two related arguments. First, because it represents a significant portion 
of the population, an encompassing organization cares more about the growth of the 
national economy than the entities representing only a very small group. As a result, it is 
less likely to introduce anti-growth policies. Second, an encompassing organization is 
also less tolerant of the heavy costs imposed by excessive redistributive policies, again 
because it represents a large portion of the population. As a result:  
Encompassing organizations have some incentive to make the society in 
which they operate more prosperous, and an incentive to redistribute 
income to their members with as little excess burden as possible, and to 
cease such redistribution unless the amount redistributed is substantial in 
relation to the social cost of redistribution (Olson 1982: 74). 
Disinterested governments, in favouring societal outcomes over specific-group interests, 
do not differ much from the encompassing organizations with respect to their ultimate 
results, but the mechanisms in these two concepts are different. While Olson considers 
the size of an organization as the central pillar for being encompassing, we emphasize 9 
the detachment of a government from specific groups as the key for its concern of the 
whole society. An example to distinguish these two mechanisms is given by the political 
arrangements of the medieval Genoa (Greif 2006), where initial politics was 
characterized by competing clans, none of which had absolute dominance. As a result—
because of the lack of an encompassing organization in the sense implied by Olson—the 
city was engulfed by prolonged clan fights and instability. The solution proposed by the 
clans was to hire a podesteria (a knight with his own army) to run the city. Making 
money was the podesteria’s primary goal, but since he was an outsider with no personal 
ties to any clan, he was more likely to take a neutral stand on city affairs, and for that 
matter, was more likely than an insider to advance the city’s long-term welfare. In other 
words, the podesteria acted like a disinterested government although he and his army 
were few in number in relation to the population of the city. 
Under the two concepts, policy recommendations, in addition to the mechanisms, can 
also be different. In a democratic polity, or any polity with a reasonable range of 
political diversity, it is hard to find an encompassing organization because none of the 
organizations can be large enough to act in an encompassing way. However, a 
disinterested government may still emerge in a very diverse society if the ruling group 
remains autonomous relative to the society.  
Lastly, the concept of disinterested governments has more operational values than that 
of encompassing organizations. For example, we can tell when a government is 
disinterested by checking whether different population groups are given equal treatment 
with regard to taxation, subsidies, government services, and political concerns, but we 
are not sure how large an organization should be in order to be considered as 
encompassing. Indeed, in a parallel theoretical paper, my coauthor and I (He and Yao 
2008) define a disinterested government as one that maintains the same rate of taxation 
(predation) and provides the same level of government services to two distinctive 
groups of citizens. 
5  The Chinese government as a disinterested government in the reform era 
As was pointed out in the introduction, China’s economic success needs to be traced 
back to its underlying political economy. But the excellent economic growth record is 
not evidence of the Chinese government being disinterested in the society. Instead, we 
need to show that the government has behaved in a disinterested manner when decisions 
involved interests that conflicted among different segments of society. This section 
provides three examples to show that the CCP prioritized the overall welfare of the 
society over segmental interests, even when this implied that its own powerbase 
interests were at risk. Next we discuss (i) the emergence of the growth consensus at the 
beginning of economic reform, (ii) the evolution of the dual-track price system, and (iii) 
reform of the state-owned enterprises. These three areas illustrate some of main thrusts 
of the disinterested nature of China’s officials during the last thirty years.  
5.1  The growth consensus 
Since the Opium War, a strong China has been the dream of several generations of 
Chinese leaders. Its encounter with the western powers in the 1800s taught China the 
painful lesson that without economic power, it would be bullied by others. 10 
Unfortunately, economic growth was interrupted by civil wars, the Japanese invasion, 
and the incompetence of the Guomingtang government. The establishment of the 
People’s Republic in 1949 gave the country a chance to concentrate on economic 
growth, but the dream was shattered repeatedly by political movements. The pragmatic 
leadership centred around Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s finally enabled China to 
pursue its century-long dream of economic prosperity. The growth consensus emerged 
as a way to unite the country towards that goal. 
The essence of this consensus was to prioritize economic construction in all government 
and societal endeavours. The CCP quietly abandoned its conviction of an egalitarian 
society and began—in Deng Xiaoping’s words—‘to let some people get rich first’. In 
other words, CCP’s agenda was shifted from redistribution to economic growth, thus 
accomplishing one important step from a populist government to a disinterested 
government. This was not easy, as can be expected in a country that had been 
dominated by orthodox Marxist teachings. To win popular support in the party, Deng 
Xiaoping initiated the ‘truth debate’ at the end of 1978. The issue was not a debate on 
whether to have more markets, but was framed in a philosophic discussion about the 
sources of truth. This proved to be a wise political strategy; it disguised the true 
intention under a classical Marxist issue, preempting a rejection by the conservatives to 
the debate. The conclusion was that there could be only one source of truth, and that 
was practice. Thus, a door was opened to experiment and change. These would 
ultimately transform China into a totally different country, but at the time, leadership 
was determined that embracing the market was the only option if China were to start 
growing again. To forestall rebuffing by the conservatives, Deng Xiaoping set the tone 
by stating simply: ‘Do not debate’.  
The growth consensus accomplished several results. First, it unified the party and the 
country. After the dark years of the cultural revolution, people were tired of the political 
tempo and needed a new direction. The CCP itself was divided. Mao’s successor, Hua 
Guofeng, despite being more rational than the ultra-radicals of the cultural revolution, 
still held on to Mao’s legacy and further steered China in a radical direction. Deng 
Xiaoping and other moderates believed that changes were needed, but did not want to 
have a head-on confrontation with Hua. Shifting the party’s emphasis to economic 
construction would induce changes in the system, but in the same time it would also 
preempt objections from the radical camp.  
The second accomplishment was in the area of system changes. Some of these changes 
had been envisioned and planned by the moderate camp: for example, the increase of 
agricultural prices had been a planned move to stimulate grain production, but many 
other were unanticipated, as the return to family farming, but since it increased output, 
family farms were accepted, encouraged even, by the CCP. The rise of the rural industry 
and privatization of SOEs were other examples. Once the goal was set, institutions 
became the tool to realize it. 
The third accomplishment was the change in the ideology of the CCP. Starting first with 
the notion of allowing some people get rich, the growth consensus watered down the 
party’s old convictions. After thirty years of evolution, the CCP today is no longer a 
party built on political ideology. We will come back to this topic at the end of the 
section. 11 
The growth consensus had other unintended and adverse consequences as well. In 
regions where economic growth has been overemphasized, environmental degradation, 
social inequality, erosion of the social safety net, and even the commercialization of 
local governments are common. A discussion of these consequences would be a 
diversion to the theme of this paper, but it is worth emphasizing that while the growth 
consensus, on balance, has served China well in the last thirty years, its continuation 
unaltered could change from a virtue to a vice. 
5.2  The dual-track price system 
The dual-track price system was a compromise reached in 1984 between the radical 
abandonment of and continuous adherence to socialist planning. Under this system, 
SOEs were allowed to sell their products and buy inputs in the free market once their 
planned quotas had been fulfilled. Market prices were higher than quota prices. The 
most significant example was the dual exchange rate regime that was in place between 
1984 and 1994. The central government maintained an official exchange rate, but at the 
same time opened a swap market in Shanghai where enterprises had some freedom to 
buy and sell their foreign earnings at a higher, but floating exchange rate.  
The dual-track price system had opened the door for economic incentives to play an 
important role in SOEs’ decisionmaking. Its unintended consequences, however, may 
have been more significant than the impact on SOEs. For example, the dual-track 
system enabled non-SOEs to thrive, as exemplified by township and village enterprises 
(TVEs). Central government’s planning did not extend to these rural enterprises, and it 
was difficult for them to buy materials or sell their products before the reform. Although 
they exhibited extraordinary growth in the 1970s (Lin and Yao 2001), their contribution 
to the national economy was marginal. The dual-track price system gave the TVEs 
access to markets and inputs, enabling them to prosper.  
Lau, Qian, and Roland (2000) believe that the dual-track price system had brought 
Pareto improvements to China. To a large extent, this assessment is true. However, the 
dual-track system also had serious downsides. Price differences, sometimes 
extraordinarily high, created space for rent seeking. Enterprises and government 
officials who controlled the quotas could easily get rich by selling their quotas to other 
enterprises and individuals. At the end of the 1980s, guan-dao, or official profiteering, 
became a popular phrase, creating deep public resentment. However, the people who 
controlled the quotas were CCP insiders, and according to many scholars (e.g., Murphy, 
Shleifer and Vishny 1992), this made further changes to the system very difficult. 
But the CCP proved this prediction wrong. Dual prices began to converge in the early 
1990s, and by 1994 the dual exchange rate, the last of the dual-track system, was 
dismantled. The CCP was not held back by vested interests. Instead, it had the 
resolution to eliminate the privileges enjoyed by its own insiders.  
5.3 SOEs  privatization 
SOE privatization is the best example of the Chinese government’s disinterest. 
Restructuring of the SOEs was a major aim since urban reforms began in 1984. 
Although there were calls for privatizing the SOEs, the government’s initial emphasis 
was on boosting performance by changing the internal governance of these entities 12 
through contracting. After Deng Xiaoping’s visit to southern China in 1992, serious 
privatization started in several localities (Huang and Wei 2001; Yao 2004). In 1995, 
after extensive discussion, the central government adopted the policy of zhuada 
fangxiao (or ‘keep the large and let the small go’), according to which the state decided 
to retain 500-1,000 of the large state firms, with smaller firms being leased or sold. 
From the policy came the term gaizhi, which means ‘changing the system’ and in many 
cases, this meant privatization. By the end of 1998, more than 80 per cent of state and 
collective firms at or below the county level had gone through gaizhi (Zhao 1999). By 
2005, 76.7 per cent of all the industrial SOEs existing in 1995 had either been privatized 
or gone bankrupt (Figure 1).  
1995. The cutback in collective firms was smoother, but much deeper, and by 2004, 
their employment share was only one-fourth of the 1991 level, which was the highest 
year of the 1990s. Between 1988 and 2004, non-public sector employment increased 24-
times to become the largest urban employer, hiring 71 per cent of the urban labourforce. 
In fact, the non-public sector became the largest sector already in 1998. 
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It should be noted that privatization may not necessarily be the reason for large-scale 
unemployment. On the contrary, Huang and Yao (2006) find that privatization even 
increased employment because of better performance. There were redundant workers in 
SOEs before privatization, many of whom had not been paid for years. Privatization, 
however, triggered the shake-off of these workers. There had been numerous protests in 
the country against privatization. This was a serious challenge to the CCP, causing a 
dilemma: if it supported privatization, it would lose the support of the working class, its 
own powerbase, but in giving up privatization, institutional transition would be halted 
and China would lose the opportunity to catch up with the developed world. CCP solved 
the problem by quietly continuing with privatization while striving to reemploy laid-off 
workers. This strategy worked. By the mid-2000s when the privatization of SOEs was 
being concluded, most of the unemployed had new jobs or were on government welfare 
programmes. Privatization, however, had shattered the old beliefs, and the CCP needed 
to create a new ideology.  
The above reveals the main three thrusts of the disinterested nature of the Chinese 
government. First, the growth consensus indicated that the government was able to unite 
potentially diverging forces towards the goal of economic growth. Often in developing 
countries politics are so divisive that it may become virtually impossible to form a 
consensus even on the most obvious improvement to national economy. Second, the 
convergence of the dual-track price system towards the market highlights that the CCP 
was willing to eliminate the privileges of its own members, or in other words, to 
disregard the interests of the elites and adopt policies that were beneficial to the whole 
society. Third, the SOE reform shows that the CCP was able to resist populist pressures 
in adopting a more efficient ownership structure even at the expense of its powerbase. 
Next, we show why the Chinese government has been a disinterested party over the last 
thirty years. 
6  Factors leading to a disinterested government in China 
Why has the Chinese government, and the CCP in particular, been disinterested over the 
last three decades? There may be many reasons: the Confucian culture; China’s 
humiliating history after the Opium War; and the political structure and dominance of 
the CCP. But these factor may be too specific to China to have any implications for 
other developing countries. In this section we attempt to provide three reasons which 
may have some general implications for other developing countries.  
6.1  Lessons learned in the 1949-78 period 
The 1949 Communist Revolution and the ensuing land reform and nationalization of 
industry created an equal society in China. It would seem that the CCP chose to behave 
in a disinterested way; after all, the vast majority of the population at that time belonged 
to the peasant and worker classes, and it seemed odd that the CCP’s aim to serve these 
two classes could hinder it from being an encompassing organization. But like 
Argentina during Peron, the CCP’s policies between 1949 and 1978 had a strong 
populist flavour, albeit under the cover of a socialist state.  
In the rural regions, family farming was quickly replaced by the people’s commune; 
where peasants were forced to work together. The 1958 ‘great leap  forward’ had 14 
disastrous results, including a grand scale famine. The commune system established 
after the great famine featured a work-point remuneration system that, regardless of 
actual effort, treated adult labourers more or less the same. The system resembled a 
form of taxation which taxed the more able people and compensated the less able 
workers.  
In the urban communities, salaries were very low, but state-sector employees were 
heavily subsidized by the government through food, health care, pensions, housing, and 
children’s education, placing a considerable burden on the government. In addition, the 
cities obtained net transfers from the countryside through the so-called ‘price scissors’, 
despite the already difficult life of the peasants. 
In addition to detrimental policies, the focus in the political arena was on class struggle. 
Any unorthodox action, such as selling one’s sideline products on the market, or even 
raising large-sized livestock was regarded as a sign of ‘going the capitalist road’ and 
quickly suppressed. Class struggles should have been the means to protect working 
class interests, but ultimately became a weapon against the working class itself. 
Furthermore, the entire country was to fall to political hysteria during the cultural 
revolution. Anyone daring to deviate from the political stance could be accused of being 
a class enemy and sent to labourcamp. Class struggles became a convenient weapon for 
one group to suppress another group. 
After the cultural revolution ended with Mao’s death in 1976, CCP moderates began to 
rethink implemented policies. One fact became obvious: the hyper-concentration of 
serving and relying on the working class would not benefit the country in terms of 
economic growth and would, in the end, hurt the working class itself. After the Third 
Plenum of the Eleventh Party Congress in November 1978, the term ‘class struggles’ 
was permanently eliminated from official Party documents and public discourse. The 
CCP embarked on a road towards a disinterested organization.  
6.2  An equal society 
China had become an equal society already in 1949, but the CCP’s intent on being a 
working-class party hindered it from being disinterested in the society. After the 
emphasis began to fade during the reform era, social equality enabled the CCP to adopt 
growth-oriented policies in several fields.  
First, egalitarianism has ensured that the CCP members came from roughly equal social 
groups, so the party was not burdened by class origins. This can be contrasted with the 
National Congress Party (NCP) in India, where most of the founders (such as Gandhi 
and Nehru) were Brahmins, and throughout history, it has largely remained a party 
controlled by the upper castes. This has hindered India’s efforts to implement land 
reform after independence when NCP had monopolistic political power in the country. 
CCP’s dispersed membership allowed it to implement policies that were better for the 
country as a whole than for specific classes. 
Second, an equal society has prevented the CCP from being captured by vested 
interests. In connection with dual-track prices, the CCP leadership overrode 
conventional wisdom by depriving some of the party officials of the privileges they had 
enjoyed because CCP was aware that the vast majority of Chinese people would support 
its actions. The same is true for the CCP’s continuous fight against corruption. Had the 15 
country not been equal but controlled, instead, by powerful segments on whom the CCP 
depended (as happened to Guomingtang in the past), it would have been hard to imagine 
the CCP having moved so boldly against corruption. 
Third, an equal society has also facilitated the success of the growth-oriented policies 
undertaken by CCP. Take the example of fiscal decentralization. If Chinese economists 
need to agree on one fact as the major reason for the country’s economic success, it 
would have to be fiscal decentralization. But fiscal decentralization has not been a 
panacea. Fiscal decentralization certainly did not work in Russia, and has led to local 
governments in developing countries being captured by business powers. China stands 
out as a success largely because its society is relatively egalitarian at the local level; no 
one has the resources nor the will to capture the government. To the extent that recent 
literature has found a positive relationship between equality and economic growth, we 
believe that a society that is equal also in other aspects helped China to achieve high 
economic growth. This relatively ‘easier’ result, in turn, encouraged the CCP to adopt 
growth-oriented policies.  
Some authors, discussing the political economy of the east Asian developmental states, 
have also emphasized the role of an equal society. For example, Woo-Cumings (1997) 
links Korea and Taiwan’s economic successes to their relatively equal social and 
economic structures created during Japanese colonial rule, when rural elites and urban 
industrialists were suppressed to prevent organized upheavals against the Japanese. This 
adverse intention, however, created a favourable condition for these two economies to 
succeed because it uprooted the entrenched interests: 
This discontinuity had a powerful levelling effect, equalizing incomes 
more than in most developing countries and providing a fertile ground 
for instituting effective interventionist states, which were given a 
relatively free hand to forge a developmental coalition as they saw fit 
(Woo-Cumings 1997: 331).  
From this perspective, mainland China is not much different from Korea and Taiwan 
even though the equal social structure was created through its own revolutionary action 
rather than by foreign imperial rules. 
6.3  The CCP’s ideological adjustments  
In the last thirty years, the CCP has undertaken a series of ideological shifts, some 
small, some large, but the cumulative effect has been substantial. Maybe the central 
conviction—building a strong and equitable China—has not changed, but the ideas of 
how the society should be organized to achieve the goal have changed radically. The 
party has been transformed from a proletarian to an all people’s party. Major ideological 
shifts during the period 1978-2006 are given in Figure 3, which identifies three main 
waves.  
The first wave was between 1978 and 1987. The Third Plenum of the Eleventh Party 
Congress in 1978 started the reform process by giving up the radical ideology of the 
cultural revolution and adopting a pragmatic approach to economic institutions. Then in 
1987 the Thirteenth Party Congress ratified the reforms that had been initiated almost a 
decade ago, summarizing them in the ‘socialist primary stage’ theory. This theory 
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abandoned the goal of building communism in China, emphasizing instead that the 
country was still in the primary stage of socialism and should thus adopt a flexible 
approach to economic institutions.  
The second wave lasted from 1993 to 2002. After the 1989 Tiananmen incident, there 
was a major setback to the reform process. In the spring of 1992, Deng Xiaoping visited 
southern China, and reform was reintroduced. As official acknowledgement for the 
direction of the reform, the Third Plenum of the Fourteenth Party Congress in 1993 
proposed the concept of ‘socialist market economy’, triggering the largest wave of 
reforms in the 1990s. The result of this wave in ideological shift was the announcement 
of the ‘three representations’ at the Sixteenth Party Congress held in 2002. The CCP no 
longer represented merely the proletarians, but also ‘the requirements of the advanced 
productive forces in China, the future direction of China’s advanced culture, and the 
essential interests of the vast majority of Chinese people’. The CCP has since then 
formally announced being a party of the country instead of the working class. In terms 
of its achievements in the 1990s—structural adjustment and SOE privatization—this 
declaration was not novel and indicated that CCP had given up its role as the guardian 
of the working class interests. In other words, it had declared being disinterested in the 
society. 
The third wave is just beginning; its symbolic move was the announcement of the 
concept ‘harmonious society’ at the Sixth Plenum of the Sixteenth Party Congress held 
in 2006. A harmonious society embodies ‘democracy and the rule of law, fairness and 
justice, honesty and mutual love, energetic dynamics, peace and order, and harmony 
between man and nature’. The key words are ‘fairness and justice’. Along its road to 
high economic growth, the growth consensus accumulated many unresolved problems. 
One major consequence of the spearheaded growth of the last thirty years has been the 
expanding income gap between rural and urban residents. With urban per capita income 
being 3.3 times that of rural residents, China is the most divided country in the world, 
not only in terms of the urban-rural gap but also between the coastal and inland regions. 
Twenty-two million urban residents are on government welfare. This new wave of 
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ideological shift is aimed at remedying the adverse effects of high economic growth. 
Some people tend to believe that the shift symbolizes the return of the egalitarian policy 
of the past, but dressed in a populist coat. However, extreme inequality has been both 
theoretically and empirically proven to be detrimental to economic growth; therefore, 
this new shift of the CCP ideology is still consistent with its role as a disinterested 
government. 
The first and third factors have implications for other developing countries because they 
show the importance of pragmatism in driving China’s reform and economic success. 
Pragmatism rejects ultimate truth, and for that matter, it ought to reject first-best in 
policymaking. A pragmatist is always aware of the tentativeness of the current state of 
affairs including the institutions that run the society and is always ready to make 
changes as soon minor improvements are possible. He is also keen to learn from his 
failures. The second cause is related to the social structure of a country. An equal 
society is beneficial in many ways; this paper shows that it provides a foundation for the 
government to act more in the interests of the whole society. 
7 Conclusions 
This paper has provided a political economy explanation for China’s impressive record 
of economic growth. Our explanation is centred on the notion of a disinterested 
government. We have provided evidence to show that China has indeed been 
characterized by a disinterested government during its reform era. We identified three 
factors which caused this development and which we believe will have general 
implications for other developing countries. 
China is unique with regard to its historical and contemporary political settings. But the 
main idea emerging from this paper that remains valid for all the developing countries, 
is a disinterested government is the key to the adoption of pro-growth policies in a 
country. Most countries have failed to create such a government. It is a commonality 
rather than the exception that countries are either captured by business elites or hijacked 
by populist pressures. A society that is both economically and socially equal is more 
likely to create a disinterested government. Social equality is perhaps more important 
than economic equality because social inequality is often associated with races and 
stigmas, whereas economic inequality can be rectified by government policies.  
One question remains: does the one-party system, as in China, hinder the applicability 
of the Chinese experience to other developing countries, many of which have at least a 
nominal democratic system. As was pointed out earlier, the CCP’s dominance may have 
helped the Chinese authorities to develop into a disinterested government. This 
observation can remain valid, even when we are certain that the authoritarian state is 
neither a necessary nor sufficient foundation for a disinterested government to emerge. 
It is possible that the CCP’s rule matched China’s historical, social and cultural settings 
well to achieve a unique mix conducive to the emergence and sustainability of a 
disinterested government. However, even in that case, the Chinese experience provides 
a valid lesson for other developing countries. Every country is unique, but every country 
has elements conducive to economic growth, and it is the task of each nation to piece 
together the forces that dominate in the society. In a sense, it is not the form of the 
government that matters; what matters is the incentive structure of the society: the 18 
formal and informal rules that guide people’s actions. Each country should and can find 
ways to build up an incentive structure that is conducive for a disinterest government to 
emerge. Such a structure does not need to emulate any existing model, utilizing instead 
all resources, the traditional but also seemingly unorthodox mechanisms. Again, a sense 
of pragmatism will help. 
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